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Abstract 
 
In this paper Engel-Granger time series methodology is used to combine trending economic 
variables with stationary political factors to search for well-defined political influences on 
central government budgets in Canada over the entire post-Confederation time period from 1870 
to 2000. To motivate such an inquiry we first investigate and find evidence of partisan political 
influence on Canada’s macro aggregates. However, because politics can influence economic 
outcomes only if there is a transmission mechanism through actual public policy choices, our 
finding of cycles in real output growth begs the question of whether such cycles arise through 
fiscal policy. Our analysis of three main fiscal policy instruments - public non-interest 
expenditure, taxation and the deficit net of interest - gives little support to any current political 
theory of public budgets, but does support the hypothesis that the degree of political competition 
matters for policy choices in both the long and short run. This new channel for the influence of 
politics on economic policy has not previously been isolated empirically in Canada and poses 
new questions in trying to reconcile the previous mixed results with respect to the influence of 
politics on economic aggregates. 
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Politics, political competition and the political budget cycle in Canada, 1870 – 2000: 
a search across alternative fiscal instruments1
 
 
I. Introduction 
Alesina, Roubini and Cohen (1997), Sapir and Sekkat (2002), and Bartels and Brady 
(2003) among many others have argued that the macroeconomic data in many countries are 
broadly suggestive of the cycles predicted by rational opportunistic and/or partisan political 
theories.  These hypotheses argue that overtly political variables, such as the timing of elections 
and the ideology of the political party in power, can affect systematically such aggregate 
macroeconomic time series variables as the rate of growth of real output and/or rate of inflation. 
In this paper we begin an exploration of these interrelationships in Canada by asking whether 
such cycles can be found in the annual data covering Canada’s long post-confederation time 
period.  Because the case for a political cause to these cycles can be made compelling only if we 
can identify a mechanism through which political influence has been exercised, we then take up 
the challenge proposed by Bartels and Brady (2003) to further investigate plausible transmission 
mechanisms and ask whether political control was exercised through fiscal policy.2  In essence 
we ask whether historical variations in the different dimensions of government size are 
consistent with the same political factors that appear to cause Canada’s output cycles.   
 To capture the transmission process, we use Engel-Granger cointegration and error 
correction methodology to investigate the different ways in which the instruments of fiscal 
policy (expenditure, taxation, and the deficit) have been influenced by economic and political 
                                                          
1  An earlier version of this paper was presented at the CEA Meetings in Montreal, May 2006.  We thank Patrick 
Coe and Keith Acheson for comments that improved the substance and presentation of our argument. 
2  Bartels and Brady (2003, 159) write, “One might imagine economists reacting to Hibb’s work by launching a 
major effort to understand the processes by which partisan politics shape economic policy and performance. 
However, no such effort appears underway.” 
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factors over the 1870 to 2000 time period in Canada.3  In designing our tests we wish to 
incorporate two potentially competing sets of concerns.  First, we wish to model the extent to 
which both the level and changes in the level of the policy instruments reflect “economic 
fundamentals”, that is, reflect the underlying economic interests of the community.  In addition, 
we would like the analysis to be able to indicate the presence of, and then distinguish among, 
three different routes by which distinctly political factors could have shaped economic policy. 
 While democratic governments would be expected to implement policies that reflect the 
economic concerns of their electorate, a distinctly political influence on public policy could be 
expected simply because economic policies are developed and implemented by agents who 
compete in political as well as economic markets and hence respond to political incentives. To 
test for this additional dimension to policy, we first use public choice (Downs 1957, Borcherding 
1985) to suggest a long run model of government size based on economic fundamentals.  Then 
by adding a set of explicit political variables to the model, we can test for the presence of 
additional political influences on size. Second, there is a long history in economics of relying on 
political competition to explain why public policy choices should converge on underlying 
fundamentals (Stigler 1972, Becker 1983). More recently, spatial voting theory (Coughlin 1994, 
Hettich and Winer 1999) has formalized the role of political party competition in minimizing 
rent dissipation by focusing on how party platforms that cater strictly to the interests of sub-
groups of voters are eliminated. Even more recently, scholars using cross country data have 
noted that political budget cycles appear more pronounced in newer as compared to older 
democracies (e.g., Schuknecht 1996, Block 2002) and have attributed this to the inexperience of 
voters and/or lack of relevant information needed to expose fiscal manipulation (Bender and 
                                                          
3  The length of our time period and the availability of data have meant that we cannot pursue the question of how 
the composition of government spending/taxation has been influenced by overt political factors.   
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Drazen 2005).  From our perspective, the continued emphasis on political competition suggests 
that even within a single parliamentary democracy over a long time period, changes in the degree 
of political competition should matter and this prompts our search for such evidence in the time 
series processes of fiscal instruments. Finally, there is an extensive literature (following Hibbs 
1977 and Nordhaus 1975) that tests the hypotheses that political parties in power will use policy 
for electoral or ideological advantage, so producing political cycles in aggregate macro data.  
Such reasoning motivates our search for evidence of the effect of explicitly political variables 
(election timing, party affiliation, etc.) on Canadian fiscal policy instruments over the short run. 
 Our approach to analyzing these questions comes from the recognition that government 
policies have distinctly different long run and short run objectives that upon implementation 
become co-mingled in time series data. Hence any test of the role of fiscal policy in relation to 
either the long or short run must do more than mechanically separate deterministic/stochastic 
trends.  Rather the analysis should use theory to derive an explicit long run - short run 
separation.  Here we use public choice theory to model explicitly the long run level of policy 
instruments.  Formally this involves finding a set of variables that span the relevant time period 
and form an essential part of a theory of long run government expenditure/tax size.  Because the 
typical variables suggested in the literature are all I(1), it is natural to test for evidence of a long 
run equilibrium relationship among that set of I(1) variables by asking whether there is evidence 
of cointegration among the variables (Engel and Granger, 1987). Given that a cointegrating 
relationship can be found, the lagged residuals from that equation can be used to form an error 
correction model of short run adjustment.  These two equations then form our base case 
representing ‘economic fundamentals’.  By adding a set of explicit political variables to these 
equations we can test whether political variables add to the explanatory power of the model and, 
should they do so, interpret the way in which such variables matter. 
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 Our findings pose somewhat of a paradox for accepted versions of political influence.  
Our results are consistent with the findings of economists such as Kneebone and MacKenzie 
(1999 and 2001) who find strong evidence of distinct political influence on economic outcomes.  
Yet following others, such as Serletis and Afxentiou (1998), we also find no evidence that fiscal 
policy instruments form part of the transmission process between politics and government 
policy.  On the other hand, we do find evidence consistent with the hypothesis that the degree of 
political competition does matter for the evolution of government size through time and 
particularly with respect to fiscal policy in the short run.  The latter is a novel discovery that 
highlights the recent attention given to the role of political competition in the literature (Besley, 
Persson and Sturm 2005).   
 The paper proceeds as follows.  In Section II we motivate our analysis of fiscal policy 
instruments by asking if there is any evidence in Canadian time series macro data that politics 
matters. Our finding that the pattern of real output growth is not inconsistent with partisan 
political theories of the business cycle leads to our search across fiscal instruments for a 
mechanism(s) by which political influence has been transmitted through policy into economic 
outcomes.  In section III we undertake that search by building a cointegration model of the long 
run expenditure and tax size of government.  After finding evidence consistent with a long run 
equilibrium relationship between these measures of government size and a set of fundamental 
economic variables, we look for evidence of a transitory effect on size coming either from the 
degree of political competition or any of the other political variables that appear to be successful 
in explaining real output growth.  Section IV extends this analysis to the error correction model 
and hence to the role of political factors in relation to the short run cycle.  Section V reviews the 
consistency of our major findings for policy with the earlier political business cycle findings of 
Section II, and Section VI presents our conclusions. 
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II.   Is there any evidence of a political cycle in Canadian macroeconomic data? 
 We begin by asking whether there is any evidence that distinctly political factors have 
played an independent role in determining aggregate macroeconomic outcomes in Canada.  The 
time series variables we consider as aggregate outcomes are real output growth (GROWTH), 
measured as the rate of growth of real Gross National Product (GNP), and inflation rates 
(INFLATION), measured as the rate of change of the GNP deflator.  The descriptive statistics 
for these variables are found in Table 1a.4  However, before we can answer whether political 
factors explain these measures of macroeconomic performance, we must first control for 
variations in output growth and inflation that arise for reasons independent of domestic electoral 
politics. Here we are fortunate. Because Canada is small relative to the U.S. and highly 
integrated with its economy, and because Canadian political choices would be expected to have 
little effect on U.S. economic outcomes, the growth rate of the U.S. Index of Industrial 
Production, USGROWTH, and the growth rate of the U.S. GDP price deflator, USINFLATION, 
make ideal controls for the importance of nonpolitical economic forces driving the Canadian 
economy.  
[Table 1 here] 
 Given that the current and lagged values of these variables control for economic factors, 
the traditional reasons for expecting an independent political effect on aggregate economic 
outcomes come from either opportunistic or partisan motives for why political parties might 
                                                          
4  Because the unemployment rate is unavailable prior to the 1920's, we cannot use it as an outcome variable. 
However, Heckelman (2006) finds no evidence of a rational partisan cycle in recent Canadian monthly data 
(spanning 1960:1 to 1993:12). 
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want to influence aggregate demand and so output.5  Hence traditional opportunistic political 
theories argue that the incumbent political party will use its control over government policy to 
gain votes opportunistically by increasing aggregate demand in the period leading into each 
election (Nordhaus, 1975).  This incentive is independent of the ideology of the party in power 
and would be observable through higher rates of real output growth in (or immediately before) 
the period of the election, followed, perhaps, by somewhat higher rates of inflation in the period 
of (or immediately following) the election.6  Rational opportunistic theories invoke the Lucas 
Critique to critique traditional theory by emphasizing that such spending must be unanticipated 
to be effective and hence highlight asymmetric information and signaling as alternative reasons 
for the effectiveness of government spending.7  To test whether the data are consistent with 
traditional opportunism, we use the dummy variable, ELECTIONYEAR, taking the value 1 in 
the year of a federal election and 0 otherwise, and look for a positive effect of ELECTIONYEAR 
on both GROWTH and INFLATION.8  The descriptive statistics for this and other political 
                                                          
5  See Alesina, Roubini, and Cohen (1997, particularly pages 36 and 62) for a convenient summary of opportunistic 
and partisan political theories. Haynes and Stone (1990) suggest that partisan and opportunistic effects may not be 
separable, where interdependence can be tested for with interaction terms. Experimentation produced no instances 
where such interaction was significant in our data. Another issue pointed to by Haynes and Stone - that political 
cycles may persist over time - is allowed for via the error-correction methodology adopted. 
6  Here the analysis relies on sticky prices to permit increases in aggregate demand to lead first to real output 
increases before following through into price effects.   
7  See Rogoff and Silbert, 1988.  Such arguments also abstract from real effects that might arise from government 
redistribution, as might be observable in changes in the composition of government taxation or spending. 
8 In Canada, elections bunch in the spring and fall. Our criterion for dating elections was to have ELECTIONYEAR 
reflect the first full year in power. Hence elections arising between January 1 and June 30 were considered in the 
current calendar year, those after July 1were placed in the following year. With annual dating, it is also unclear in 
which year the hypothesized increase in aggregate output/inflation should arise. Hence all growth equations were 
run with ELECTIONYEAR entered first contemporaneously and then with a lag. This produced only minor 
differences with no significant lagged coefficients. For the inflation equation, ELECTIONYEAR was used first then 
entered with a lead, the latter because inflation would be viewed by the electorate as a bad. 
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variables (to be discussed below) are also found in Table 1a. What is important to note is that all 
these political variables are stationary in levels.9
 Partisan political theories, following Hibbs (1977) and others, suggest that the ideology 
of the political party in power will matter.  Applying this to Canada, the center-left leaning 
Liberal Party of Canada would be expected to spend more when in power, while its more 
conservative rival would be expected to spend less. Hence our test for traditional partisanship is 
a positive sign for the effect of a one-zero dummy variable, LIBERAL (where each 1 represents 
a year when the Liberal Party was in power) on both growth and inflation and a negative sign for 
the conservative alternative (1-LIBERAL).10  Because any predictable policy should be 
anticipated and hence incorporated into private behavior, rational partisan theories refine the 
traditional hypothesis by noting that it is only to the extent that the electoral outcome is uncertain 
that the realization of a liberal party victory could generate an unexpected boost to aggregate 
output (Alesina, 1987).  To test the rational partisanship hypothesis we must then account for 
both the ideology of the party winning power and the degree of surprise in the election result. 
The latter we incorporate by assuming that the degree of surprise in an election is inversely 
related to the ex-post size of the winning majority and hence measure the degree of surprise as 
one minus the fraction of seats won by the winning party, (1-SEATS). The direction of the 
surprise is indicated by the partisan characteristic of the party in power.11  
                                                          
9 The correlation among the political variables is typically low. For example, the correlation coefficient between 
SEATSA and SURPRISEA is -0.20 and between DURATION and SEATSA is -0.09. 
10  Note that because LIBERAL and (1-LIBERAL) sum to one, both cannot be included in the regression equation.  
For this reason we test whether the composite variable [LIBERAL – (1-LIBERAL)] is positive in its effect on 
growth. This preserves degrees of freedom at the cost of imposed symmetry of effect. 
11 We do not test whether the size of the surprise is viewed as biased against the incumbent governing party.  See 
Heckelman (2002) who argues that Canadian data (1965-1996) is more consistent with symmetry. 
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Finally, the significance of partisanship for the business cycle is that depending on which 
party wins, the growth rate will change in the opposite direction. Hence to preserve this measure 
of difference, we test the traditional partisan hypothesis through the composite variable,   
   PARTISAN = LIBERAL - (1-LIBERAL),  
and test for rational partisanship through the composite variable,  
SURPRISE = (1-SEATS)*[LIBERAL-(1-LIBERAL)]. 
The coefficients of both variables are predicted to have a positive sign.12
 Lastly, because the effect of a “rational” partisan electoral surprise should diminish 
through time, we define the following duration variable,  
  DURATION = ELAPSE*[LIBERAL – (1 – LIBERAL)], 
where ELAPSE represents the number of years since the last election. Because the stimulation to 
(contraction in) real output/inflation arising from a surprise Liberal (Conservative) party victory 
should dissipate as its victory is recognized, the coefficient on DURATION is expected to be 
negative. 
 The results of our test for political cycles in Canada’s annual macroeconomic data from 
1870 through 2000 are presented in the OLS regression equations in Tables 2 and 3.  Here each 
equation was run twice to allow for two measures of political outcome, labeled as definitions A 
and B. Different interpretations of the surprise in election outcomes arise in Canada (especially 
in the first half of the 20th century) because closely associated, nominally independent 
candidates often ran unopposed by the winning political party and, once elected, tended to vote 
with the winning party.  Hence judging whether or not the seats won by these parties formed part 
                                                          
12  Note that following our treatment of PARTISAN, our specification of surprise imposes symmetry on the 
hypothesized opposing effects of LIBERAL and (1-LIBERAL) on GROWTH and INFLATION. When the two 
partisan variables were run separately for surprise (corresponding to Table 2 column (2)), the two coefficients were 
found to have opposite signs (3.14 versus -1.64) and insignificantly different from each other in absolute value.  
Individually, the two partisan surprise variables were insignificantly different from zero. 
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of the winning majority/minority is often problematic.13 In Tables 2 and 3, definition A refers to 
the combination of Beck’s (1968) judgment of the size of the coalition that was durable through 
1945 and the official results given by the Chief Electoral Officer from 1945 onwards.  Definition 
B follows the Canadian Parliamentary Guide in using official party titles to count the number of 
seats won by any officially designated political party.  The first column of the table represents 
the test of traditional opportunism with traditional partisanship while the remaining four columns 
represent the tests of opportunism with rational partisanship. Columns (2) and (4) represent the 
two definitions of surprise run over the entire 1870-2000 time period whereas Columns (3) and 
(5) retest rational partisanship over the shorter 1921-2000 sub-period (for which data are more 
reliable).  For robustness, the equations were also run over the 1945 – 2000 time period and with 
the addition of a zero-one dummy variable to test for the differential importance of periods of 
fixed exchange rates - 1870-1914, 1926-1931, 1939-1951, 1960-1972.14  The shorter time period 
produced no appreciable change in the form of the results (but with diminished significance) and 
the use of the fixed exchange rate dummy neither improved the regression fit nor was itself 
significant (nor were experiments interacting fixed exchange rates with different political 
variables). 
[Tables 2 and 3 here] 
 The results in Table 2 illustrate that despite the importance of purely economic factors in 
explaining the growth rate of Canadian output, as reflected in the significance of USGROWTH 
and its lags, the set of political variables does assist in explaining real output growth. Of the 
                                                          
13 For example, in the election of September 1926, the Canadian Parliamentary guide has the Liberal party elected 
with a minority of 116 out of 245 seats.  Beck considers the electoral outcome as a Liberal majority of 116 plus 12 
independently affiliated members for 128 out of 245 seats.  For the combination of Beck and the Chief Electoral 
Officer, minority governments arise in 1922-26, 1957, 1962-67, 1973-74, and 1979 (15 of 131 years or 11.5% of 
the years). The Canadian Parliamentary Guide has minorities in 1922-30, 1957, 1962-67, 1973-74, and 1979 (19 of 
131 or 14.5% of the years). The percentage of seats won exhibits a larger number of minor differences.  
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fourteen different political coefficients in this table, all have their predicted sign with five of the 
coefficient estimates significantly different from zero. A Wald test rejects the hypothesis that the 
political variables as a group are jointly insignificant (at ten percent or better) in four of the five 
equations and the remaining set would rejects the null hypothesis of insignificance at the sixteen 
percent level.   
 Table 3, on the other hand, shows that the political variables have less success in 
explaining the movement of the inflation rate. Nevertheless, all of the political coefficient 
estimates still have their predicted sign and again five coefficient estimates are significantly 
different from zero at ten percent. On the other hand, none of the political coefficient estimates 
remain significant at five percent and only in the case of equation (1), the test of opportunism 
and traditional partisanship, is the hypothesis of no significance for the political variables as a 
group rejected by the data. We conclude, then, that while Canada’s macroeconomic data does not 
contradict the hypothesis of political cycles in both annual real output growth and inflation rates 
over the 1870 to 2000 time period, the data gives more support to the hypothesis of political 
cycles in real growth rates and only limited support to the hypothesis of a political cycle in the 
inflation rate.15
 We turn next to which particular hypotheses are consistent with the political cycles found 
in economic outcomes. First, the hypothesis that opportunistic pre-election spending results in a 
significantly positive effect on current output growth is not supported by the data. Although the 
ELECTIONYEAR coefficients had their expected sign in each growth equation, none of the 
coefficient estimates were significantly different from zero. On the other hand, opportunism 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
14 These results are available on request.  See also Winer (1986b). 
15  This latter finding is also consistent with Winer (1986a) who found weak evidence of political cycles only in 
higher frequency (quarterly) monetary data in the post-1972 period of exchange rate flexibility. 
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receives more support in the inflation data with three of the five ELECTIONYEAR coefficient 
estimates significantly different from zero at ten percent.16  Note, however, that in both sets of 
equations as the time period shortens, evidence of opportunism becomes less significant, largely 
disappearing in the inflation data.  Neither of the coefficients in Table 3 (or 2) for the 1921-2000 
time period were significant nor were the coefficients when the equations were re-estimated over 
the even shorter 1945-200 time period (available on request but not reported). 
On the other hand, both version of the partisan hypothesis receive strong support from 
the data.  Fully seven of the ten partisan coefficients across the two tables are both positive and 
significantly different from zero, with all five growth equation coefficients significantly different 
from zero at ten percent or better.  While both partisan hypotheses conform to the data well, in 
relative terms rational partisanship receives somewhat more support.  For the longer 1870-2000 
time period, all four of the SURPRISE coefficients (from the growth and inflation tables) are 
positive and significant, while only one of the two coefficients of PARTISAN (for growth) 
remains significantly different from zero. These results imply that LIBERAL (Conservative) 
victories are typically associated with periods of income growth (contraction) and narrower 
“surprise” victories typically associated with larger increases (decreases) in the output growth 
and future inflation.  
Finally, the political duration hypothesis - the prediction of rational partisan theory that 
the stimulating (contractionary) effect of a liberal (conservative) partisan victory should wear off 
through time - is only suggested by the data.  In all of the rational partisan equations (columns 
                                                          
16  The use of ELECTIONYEAR lagged in the growth equation and ELECTIONYEAR in the inflation equation 
produced coefficient estimates that were typically positive but of less significance. None were found to be 
significantly different from zero. 
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(2), (3), (4), and (5)) the predicted negative sign does appear consistently, but in all cases the 
coefficients are insignificantly different from zero.  
 While the partisan nature of the party winning power may be statistically significant, is 
the size of the effect substantial enough to be interesting?  To illustrate the importance of the 
surprise effect we find in the data, we ask what would be the predicted effect of a relatively 
surprising Liberal election victory on output growth?  Using as an example the narrow Liberal 
victory in late 1926 (registering a surprise value of 0.473), we take the difference between actual 
and mean SURPRISE (0.473 - 0.089 = 0.388) and then multiply the result by the coefficient 
estimate in column (2) of Table 2 (2.43). The calculation indicates that real growth would have 
been 0.94 percentage points higher than the 3.69 percent mean growth rate (of the entire 
period).17  Stated differently, our results suggest that the surprise Liberal victory in 1926 boosted 
the annual growth rate by twenty five percent more than the overall period average.  The effect 
of electoral surprise can then be both significant and substantial. 
 To summarize, whether or not the data reject the hypothesis that political variables have 
produced a political cycle in inflation, our results are consistent with the hypothesis that a 
distinct political cycle exists in Canada’s aggregate growth rate over the 1870 – 2000 time 
period. The results are strongest for entire the period and tend to fall in significance as the time 
period shortens towards the present. In terms of our individual hypotheses two features stand out. 
First, partisan effects are more evident in the growth data than opportunistic effects.18 Second, 
the data has difficulty distinguishing between traditional and rational partisan theories. While the 
                                                          
17  Other elections with similar sized 'surprises' were the 1976 and 1981 Liberal victories. 
18 These results concur with those typically found in the literature for other developed countries (see Drazen, 2000 
and Franzese, 2002). On the other hand, many of the features emphasized by opportunism, such as the signaling 
insider information are hard to capture in a time series setting. In effect, evidence of opportunism may arise more in 
the anomalies than in the regularities of the data. 
 13
surprise coefficients are consistently positive as predicted, the diminution of surprise as 
predicted under rational partisanship is only suggested rather than confirmed by the data.  
The importance of this evidence of a statistical relationship between measures of politics 
and measures of growth and/or inflation is that it motivates the search for a utilized transmission 
mechanism in fiscal public choices that can connect explicit political factors with economic 
outcomes.  That is, before we can argue that the Canadian data support the hypothesis that 
politics have caused real output cycles we need both the presence of a transmission mechanism 
that has been influenced by politics and the use of that transmission instrument in a manner that 
is consistent with the observed cycles in real output. Here we look for such evidence in relation 
to the three instruments of fiscal policy.19
 
III. Could Fiscal Policy have been used to transmit Political factors into real output?  
 To ask whether there is evidence that political factors played an independent role in fiscal 
policy in Canada, we use cointegration and error correction analysis a) to develop a base case 
model of economic fundamentals and b) to separate the long and short run dimensions of fiscal 
policy.20  Here Engel-Granger cointegration analysis is applied to three specific fiscal policy 
instruments (all defined as a proportion of GNP): the logarithm of the expenditure and tax size of 
government, LNGSIZE and LNTAXSIZE, and the difference between these two logs, 
LNDEFICIT, as our measure of the size of the federal deficit.21  These variables are graphed in 
                                                          
19 Here we follow Drazen (2000) who argues that it is easier both conceptually and empirically to justify a political 
budget cycle in fiscal rather than monetary policy. 
20 See Ferris, Park and Winer (2006) for a more extended discussion of this methodology and a comparison with 
Hodrick-Prescott methods of decomposing a time series trend and cycle. 
21  The measure of government expenditure size used in this paper is net of interest payments and inclusive of 
government grants.  It should be recognized that the three policies cannot be independent but are linked through the 
government budget constraint (where the long run No Ponzi Game condition implies the I(0) characteristic of 
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Figure 1, with LNDEFICIT appearing as the difference between the two primary series.  Perhaps 
the first thing that captures one’s attention is the difference in the way the two size measures 
have grown through time.  That is, the time path for LNTAXSIZE appears to increase in two 
relatively distinct steps, one coinciding with WW1 and the second with WW2, while expenditure 
size exhibits two distinct peaks for the two world wars and one upward step in the period 
following WW2.22  Unlike the growth in size as exhibited by these two variables, LNDEFICIT 
shows no discernable trend, varying both positively and negatively over the period as a whole. 
The full descriptive statistics for these variables are given in Table 1b. In terms of their time 
series properties, the important difference is that while the logarithms of the expenditure 
(LNGSIZE) and the tax (LNTAXSIZE) size of government are both I(1), the measure of their 
difference, the federal government deficit (LNDEFICIT), is I(0).   
 To construct a long run model of the level of government expenditure and taxation 
(relative to GDP), we require a set of variables that both span the long time period covered 
(1870-2000) and reflect the deeper structure of the Canadian economy. The variables we adopt 
are standard in the growth of government literature and have been widely used in studies across 
different (developed) democratic states.23  The starting point is almost always Wagner’s Law, 
the hypothesis that the size and scope of government increases more than in proportion as 
society grows in scale and complexity. This is interpreted as implying an elasticity of real per 
capita income (RYPC) with respect to size that is positive. Wagner’s Law is then enhanced by a 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
LNDEFICIT).  See the discussion below linking the deficit to monetary policy through changes in the monetary 
base. 
22  This implies a difference in the way that the two world wars were financed: WW1 being financed largely by 
borrowing, while WW2 was financed to a greater extent out of current taxes. 
23  See, for example, Kau and Rubin (1981), Borcherding (1985), Mueller (1986), Ferris and West (1996) and 
Borcherding, Ferris and Garzoni (2004). 
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set of public choice and spatial voting hypotheses that suggest variables such as the fraction of 
the population in agriculture (AGRIC) and who are young (YOUNG) to proxy changes in the 
structure of the economy and/or the strength of interest groups. As AGRIC declines 
(urbanization increases) and YOUNG increases, we expect greater demand for government 
services.24  To capture other structural features that may promote more (or less) government 
involvement, we use the immigration rate (IMRATIO) and the openness of the economy through 
its reliance on foreign trade (OPEN).25  All of these variables are used in log form, as indicated 
in the tables by the addition of the prefix LN to the variable names.26  Descriptive statistics for 
these variables are presented in Table 1b where it is noted that together with LNGSIZE, 
LNTAXSIZE, the entire set of explanatory variables for the long run economic model of public 
sector size is nonstationary I(1) in levels but becomes stationary I(0) in first differences. 
 Table 4 presents the results of our test for cointegration among the set of key economic 
variables characterizing long run equilibrium in government’s expenditure (columns (1) - (3)) 
and tax size (columns (4) - (6)).  Note, however, that while the cointegrating equations in (1), 
(2), (4) and (5) produce coefficient estimates that are super consistent, the standard errors of 
                                                          
24 The use of these variables rather than the more traditional variables - the degree of urbanization and the percent of 
population older than 65 years (OLD) - is dictated by the availability of data for the entire time period.  Note that 
YOUNG and OLD are not necessarily direct complements.  A younger population will increase the demand for 
education and health services, traditionally part of the public sector in Canada. 
25 Immigration played a major role in Canadian history, especially before WWI and in the decade following WWII. 
The use of OPEN in relation to government size follows the work of Rodrik (1998) and others.  There openness led 
to more government as a form of insurance against external shocks. A competing view is that openness restraining 
government growth indirectly by imposing external constraints on taxation. We shall see that this later view is more 
likely to apply in Canada. Population is often used to test for scale economies in government size. Scale economies 
are often not found (see, Borcherding, Ferris and Garzoni, 2004) and, in Canada, the population time series is of a 
different order of integration than the other variables, i.e., I(2). For this reason, population was not used. Finally, we 
note that in preliminary work the share of transfers in total federal spending was used as an additional explanatory 
variable. Although consistently negative in its effect on size, its presence was never consistent with cointegration. 
26 GSIZE and many of the other explanatory variables (IMRATIO, AGRIC, YOUNG, and OPEN) are all 
constrained to lie between zero and one.  Hence transforming these variables into logarithms (adopting the prefix 
LN) avoids restrictions on the domain of the error terms in our estimating equations. 
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these equations are likely biased because of correlations arising among innovations in the I(1) 
explanatory variables. To correct this, we used Saikkonen’s 1991 adjustment.  This implies that 
when looking for the significance of individual hypotheses, the reader should use the t-statistics 
from columns (3) and (6). 
 What that Table 4 makes clear is that the structural variables suggested by the public 
finance literature work well in explaining both the expenditure and tax size of government.  The 
base case equation in column (1) explains roughly ninety percent of the variation in government 
expenditure size. Moreover, that equation with six explanatory variables and three shift dummies 
results in residuals that when tested for stationarity produce an adjusted Dickey Fuller test 
statistic that exceeds (in absolute value) the adjusted MacKinnon (1996) critical value at one 
percent.27  Thus while the Durbin-Watson test statistic and other more general considerations 
suggest that the standard errors of specific regression coefficients will be biased, the residual 
findings suggest that the equation as a whole is not spurious and hence is consistent with the 
hypothesis of a stable long-run equilibrium relationship among the set of economic variables 
(Saikkonen, 1991).  The corresponding base case test for the determinants of the tax size of 
government in column (4) similarly passes the MacKinnon test for stationarity at one percent.  
The key difference between the two measures of size is that the tax equation is consistent with an 
additional structural break in the cointegrating equation following WWI.  The data suggests that 
tax size rises in more discrete steps than the corresponding measure of expenditure size.28  
                                                          
27  As far as we are aware, there are no tables of critical values for cointegration relationships with structural breaks 
occurring at known break points. Gregory and Hanson (1996), give approximate critical values for the ADF test of a 
Engle-Granger type cointegration equation with a single structural break arising at an unknown points. Hence 
despite the relative high (absolute) values of the ADF statistic on our cointegration residuals, the implied degree of 
significance may be overstated.  
28  This helps to reconcile our earlier inability (in Ferris, Park, and Winer 2006) to find a structural break in 
expenditure size following WW1 with earlier evidence of such a break presented by Dudley and Witt (2004). 
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 Given that we have found evidence of cointegration in our long run theories of LNGSIZE 
and LNTAXSIZE, we can turn to the hypothesis that because political competition is necessary 
for actual policy outcomes to converge on the wishes of the electorate, the degree of political 
competition should matter in the explanation of government size. Here active competition among 
political parties, it is argued, is necessary to prevent political and/or bureaucratic agents from 
dissipating economic rents, perhaps simply by preventing government resources from being 
diverted to private/party uses. To test the hypothesis that the degree of competition matters, we 
use the proportion of seats in the House of Commons won by the governing party in each 
election, SEATS, as our (inverse) measure of political competition.29  This or some similar 
measure is increasingly being used in the literature (see Levitt and Poterba 1999 and Besley, 
Persson, and Sturm 2005).30 The political competition hypothesis then states that the predicted 
sign on the coefficient of SEATS will be positive. 
 The descriptive statistics for SEATS can be found with the list of other political variables 
in Table 1a. The fact that SEATS is I(0), however, means that care must be taken interpreting its 
role in the cointegrating equations of columns (2) and (3) in Table 4.  That is, even though it is 
legitimate to combine SEATS, an I(0) variable, with a group of I(1) variables that form a 
cointegrating equation (that is itself also I(0)), its presence in the equation does not mean the 
same thing as the other I(1) economic variables. Because the SEATS is I(0), a change in political 
competition does not imply a permanent change in LNGSIZE. Rather changes in SEATS 
produce only transitory changes in long run government size (for the duration of one election) 
reflecting temporary changes in the degree of competition about the mean level of political 
                                                          
29  Here we use the Beck definition (definition A) as the size of the winning party’s share of seats, SEATS. 
30  In a British style parliamentary governments it is the proportion of seats that matters, whatever the size of the 
popular vote.  Hence we use SEATS rather than the proportion of the popular vote, won by the governing party (as 
do Besley et al. 2005).  
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competition associated with Canada’s system of parliamentary democracy and its associated 
political institutions. The results presented in columns (2) and (3) are then consistent with the 
hypothesis that changes in the degree of political competition produce transitory effects on the 
long run level of government expenditure and in this restricted sense form an integral part of the 
stochastic process describing the long run evolution of government size. 
 When the remaining set of I(0) explicit political variables are added to the cointegration 
equation for LNGSIZE, however, none were found to enhance the explanatory power of the 
equation nor give evidence of producing a transitory effect on the cointegrating relation.31  That 
is, neither the year prior to an election, ELECTIONYEAR(-1),32 nor the time period when the 
more liberal political party formed the government, LIBERAL; nor the times corresponding to 
minority government, MINORITY; nor the time in power, ELAPSE; nor the partisan weighted 
time in power, DURATION, enhanced the adjusted R2 or the ADF test statistic on the equation’s 
residual.  Hence among the set of all potential political variables, only the size of the majority of 
the winning party, SEATS, was found to increase the long run explanatory power of the equation 
and produce equation residuals consistent with stationarity.  Moreover, because SEATS is a 
measure independent of party affiliation, this is consistent with neither partisan nor opportunistic 
political theories of the cycle.  Rather it is consistent with the hypothesis that less political 
competition (through a larger ex post majority) weakens the effective constraint on spending and 
thus is reflected in the relative expansion of government services.  These findings then confirm 
the findings of Ferris, Park, and Winer (2006) for this broader measure of federal government 
expenditure size (here inclusive of intergovernmental grants). 
                                                          
31  In the fifteen permutations of political variables that could be combined with SEATS, none were found to be 
more significant than SEATS nor were any found significant in their own right.    
32 Note that ELECTIONYEAR lagged is used in the test to reflect the fact that the policy instrument must be used 
prior to its opportunistic effect on real output. 
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 On the other hand, SEATS does not work in the same way to enhance the explanation of 
the long run share of federal taxes in GNP.  Rather, the time period in which there was a 
minority government is the sole political variable that becomes significant in the LNTAXSIZE 
equation. As the coefficient estimate in column (6) attests, minority governments in Canada tend 
to reduce temporarily the government’s tax share of GNP.  Thus while authors such as 
Kontopolous and Perotti (1999) and Persson, Roland and Tabellini (2004) use common-pooling 
to motivate higher than normal levels of spending for coalition governments, our results suggest 
that, at least for Canada, tax reductions have been the mechanism of choice for incumbent 
minority governments (of all persuasions) to curry favor with the electorate.  
 Periods of minority government are, of course, time periods in which the effective degree 
of competition among political parties is so intense that no political party has been able to win a 
majority.  Viewed from this perspective, our results imply that taxation levels are reduced in 
time periods when political competition is particularly strong.  As such the tax equation finding 
for MINORITY complements our earlier result in the expenditure equation for SEATS.  That is, 
the MINORITY finding is consistent with the hypothesis that as the degree of political 
competition increases, the overall size of government falls.33  In Canada this appears to arise first 
in the form of a tightening of government expenditure levels and then, as competition passes 
some threshold of intensity, through a fall in taxation. 
 
IV.   Is there a Political Budget Cycle?  
 In Table 5 we use the residuals from the long run cointegrating equations of Table 4 to 
develop the corresponding error correction models of short run adjustment about the long run 
                                                          
33 Haynes and Stone (1990) find U.S. evidence consistent with the hypothesis that the minority party is constrained 
by competition while the majority party is freer to pursue partisan objectives. 
 20
expenditure and tax size of government. Because our political variables are I(0) it is primarily in 
these stationary short run adjustment processes that we should have our best opportunity of 
finding evidence of opportunistic or partisan political influence.  We also include in Table 4 an 
equation for the deficit as a proportion of GNP.34  This allows us to assess whether any 
particular political effect that is only suggested by either the expenditure or tax size equation 
individually combine for significance in the deficit.  Finally, an explicit focus on the deficit 
allows us to connect fiscal policy directly with monetary policy through changes in the monetary 
base and thus test whether the different arms of economic policy have moved in tandem or in 
contrast over the cycle. 
 Columns (1) and (2) present the base case error correction models that correspond to the 
long run cointegration equations found in columns (1) and (4) of Table 4.  They form the final 
stage of a testing procedure that originally added all political variables to the base case error 
correction model and then dropped successively the least significant political variable until only 
those variables that retained significance remained. As the extreme bounds test presented in the 
appendix illustrates, SEATS was the only political variable that remained significant. As such 
these results complement our earlier finding of a transitory effect in the expenditure 
cointegrating equation and reinforce the importance of political competition in bringing about 
the convergence of fiscal policy instruments on fundamentals – the tastes and technology that 
form the wishes of the electorate in relation to policy. The same pattern holds when the error 
correction models arising from the political version of the cointegrating equations in columns (2) 
and (5) of Table 4 are used.  Note that even though MINORITY produced a transitory effect on 
                                                          
34  Because LNDEFICIT is I(0) there can be no direct correspondence with the level analysis undertaken for 
expenditure and tax size. However, LNDEFICIT can be combined with the other I(0) variables – the first 
differences of the model’s “economic fundamentals” and all of the political variables – to assess whether short run 
policy actions are better reflected net rather than separately. 
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the long run tax size of government, there is no evidence in Table 4 that minority governments 
use short run tax policy any differently than do majority governments. SEATS, on the other 
hand, is both positive and significantly different from zero in all equations.  
Because of the apparent significance of partisan effects on the political business cycle 
described in section II, it is important to emphasize that neither LIBERAL nor PARTISAN add 
to the explanatory power of short run adjustment as represented by either the expenditure or tax 
error correction equations. For example, the addition of LIBERAL to equations (1) and (3) in 
Table 5 yields coefficient estimates of 0.024 (1.13) and 0.025 (1.19), respectively (where t-
statistics follow in brackets).  The corresponding estimates in the tax equations for columns (2) 
and (4) were 0.001 (0.096) and 0.001 (0.112).35  
 When we look at the nature of short-run fiscal policy as described by these equations, 
clear evidence of its counter-cyclical role appears in the two expenditure equations.  The short 
run relationship between government expenditure and per capita income is consistently negative 
(and significantly so), an effect that is completely opposite to its significant positive effect over 
the long run.  There is much less evidence of a counter-cyclical role for taxation.  If anything, 
our findings suggest the tax size of government is more likely to move with income and hence 
represent a slightly pro-cyclical role for taxation. 
 The equations for the deficit in columns (5) and (6) examine the net effect of expenditure 
and tax policy on the cycle. Here the second row of the table (corresponding to the coefficients 
of the short run change in per capita income) indicates that while government spending has been 
strongly counter-cyclical and taxation pro-cyclical, their net effect has been significantly 
                                                          
35  Similar results are found for PARTISAN. For example, the same four coefficient estimates (with t-statistics) are: 
0.010 (0.914), 0.010 (0.924), 0.0007 (0.117), and 0.0005 (0.102).  Ironically, the addition of either LIBERAL or 
PARTISAN to the deficit equation results in a significant coefficient but of the wrong sign for explaining the 
variation in output growth outlined in section II. That is, the addition of PARTISAN to (5) and (6) results in 
coefficients (t-statistics) of -0.032 (2.08) for (5) and -0.35 (2.00) for (6). 
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counter-cyclical. In addition, the deficit equation in (6) is also consistent with the hypothesis that 
political competition matters, adding to the explanatory power of the deficit model implied by 
economic fundamentals. Thus while a fall in political competition (rise in SEATS) typically 
increases both government spending and taxation, the deficit equation tells us that expenditure 
consistently rises by more than taxes such that the size of the deficit increases significantly.  
 It follows that a decline in political competition, by raising both the short run rate of 
growth of government spending and the size of the deficit, will mute the counter-cyclical role of 
fiscal policy by adding an expansionary asymmetry to policy instrument use in relation to the 
cycle.  Moreover, that short run asymmetry is reinforced by the fact that equations (5) and (6) 
show considerably more persistence than do either of the separate equations for expenditure or 
taxation.  Such persistence in the size of the deficit adds to the overall expansionary impact 
transmitted by the lack of political competition and thus reinforces the asymmetric nature of 
fiscal policy in relation to the cycle. 
 In summary, while there is no evidence to confirm the role of political opportunism or 
partisanship in the budget cycle, there is considerable evidence that political competition, as 
measured (inversely) by the size of the majority (in seats) won by the governing political party, 
does matter, particularly in relation to the shorter run adjustment processes about long run policy 
levels. Moreover, that evidence is consistent not only with the hypotheses that political 
competition restrains the growth rate of government size (and the deficit) temporarily, but with 
the hypothesis that the absence of political competition will impart a bias into short run counter-
cyclical policy.  In this sense, a weakening of the degree of effective political competition may 
help to explain what is often seen as a growing asymmetry in the impact of federal economic 
policy – stronger in promoting expansion than in imposing restraint. 
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 Finally, because the government’s deficit must be financed, the way the deficit is 
financed may, in itself, have consequences for the performance of the economy. In this respect it 
is often argued that greater private market borrowing will raise market interest rates and so 
crowd out the expansionary power of any new fiscal spending.  Such crowding out, it is also 
argued, can be minimized to the extent that the new debt issue is purchased by the Bank of 
Canada.36  In such cases the Bank accommodates fiscal policy and this monetization becomes 
observable as an increase in the stock of high powered or base money, in circulation.  In 
equation (6), we test for the accommodation of fiscal policy by the Bank of Canada by adding 
the change in the money base as a fraction of GNP to the deficit equation in column (5).37 The 
result, appearing as the significant positive coefficient in the last row of column (6), indicates 
that increases in the money base are associated with increases in the deficit and thus is consistent 
with accommodation. Stated alternatively, there is evidence that monetary and fiscal policy 
worked together (were coordinated) over our time period. 
 
V. Does the political business cycle coincide with the political budget cycle? 
 While we used the evidence from our test of theories of the political business cycle in 
Canada to motivate our search for the role of politics in relation to the different instruments of 
fiscal policy, it is useful at this point to review the extent to which the two sets of findings are 
consistent with each other. That is, for political factors to drive real output, there must be a 
sympathetic correspondence in policy instruments.   
                                                          
36  Because the Bank of Canada was created only in 1935, the application of this argument to the Bank of Canada is 
applicable only from that date onward. 
37  The money base ratio had no significant effect on spending or taxation per se, only on the deficit. It is not logged 
like the rest of the variables because its change sometimes becomes negative.  
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When applying this test to our set of fiscal policy instruments, it is clear that there is no 
simple one-to-one correspondence between the two sets of results. For example, there is no 
counterpart in the analysis of the political business cycle to the multiple roles found for political 
competition in relation to fiscal policy instruments and hence no variable that directly tests the 
relationship between political competition and final output. Moreover, if we simply add SEATS 
as an explanatory variable back into the equation testing opportunism and traditional 
partisanship (equation (1) of Table 2), SEATS is found to be negative and insignificant (without 
diminishing the significance of PARTISAN).38 While a positive effect might have been expected 
from SEATS (increasing government size, aggregate demand and so output), the negative 
coefficient found underscores our contention that less political competition (higher SEATS) 
results in greater rent dissipation that diminishes the efficiency of any expenditure level of 
government service. This would lower the effective real size of government and so diminish real 
output growth. The insignificance of that suggested relationship means that any such relationship 
must remain speculative. 
Similarly, MINORITY has yet to appear in our analysis of the political business cycle. 
However, the significance of MINORITY in the long run cointegrating equation for the tax size 
of government in Table 4 does imply that taxation levels will be lower in periods of minority 
government (independent of partisan affiliation). This suggests that the use of the dummy 
variable MINORITY in the growth equation should yield a positive coefficient without 
otherwise diminishing the significance of the partisan effect. When MINORITY is added to 
equation (1) of Table 2, the coefficient is indeed positive but also insignificantly different from 
                                                          
38 The coefficient estimates and associated t-statistics (in brackets) when SEATSA and SEATSB are added to 
equation (1) of Table 2 are, respectively, -1.23 (0.309) and -0.846 (0.225). 
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zero.39 Perhaps because of the relatively few periods of minority government (only five episodes 
of seven minority government over our 131 year), the hypothesized asymmetric behavior of 
governments in minority in relation to output growth remains problematic.  
Our findings then pose a series of significant puzzles. The political variables found to be 
significant in the policy equations - SEATS and MINORITY – show little sign of significance 
when incorporated into the pattern of real output growth arising in the political business cycle 
equations.40  Moreover, despite reasonably strong evidence of political partisanship in output, 
there is no trace of a corresponding partisan response in any of our fiscal policy instruments over 
either the short or long run.  Nor is there evidence of opportunism, at least at the aggregate level. 
The juxtaposition of these two sets of findings leaves an important puzzle for economists and 
political scientists alike.  Unless evidence can be presented for a significant political influence on 
either monetary policy or compositional changes in government spending or taxation and their 
link to final output, the evidence is more consistent with the hypothesis that causality runs in the 
opposite direction--from economic circumstance to political outcome.41  Should expected good 
times signal a greater willingness to vote for more liberal political parties, both the correlation 
between politics and outcomes and the absence of a correlation between policy and politics 
would be explained.   
 
VI. Conclusion 
 In their review of work on the political business cycle, Bartels and Brady (2003, 159) 
wonder why, despite strong evidence of political influences on output growth, so little work has 
been done by economists to link political influences to policy to outcomes.  In exploring this 
                                                          
39 More specifically, its coefficient is 0.650 with a t-statistic of 1.09. 
40 Of the two, MINORITY, enters typically with its expected sign and a higher level of significance.   
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question for Canada, our analysis suggests that easy answers will not be forthcoming.  What we 
have shown is that at least for Canada, the most likely routes by which political influence could 
have been used to affect economic outcomes have not been utilized. Thus while more indirect 
connections between politics and outcomes may well be present, greater insight and analysis will 
be needed to tease out propositions that allow new tests of empirical relevance.  
In Canada, much of the previous work seeking to link political and economic outcomes 
has used Hodrick-Prescott filtered variables to test time series data for the short run relationships 
implied by the various political theories of the cycle.  Here the findings have been mixed.  
Kneebone and McKenzie (1999, 2001) use Hodrick-Prescott filters to control for the long run 
factors behind federal and provincial government deficits and find evidence of ‘pronounced’ 
opportunism and ‘strong evidence’ of partisanship at all levels of government and in all stages of 
the fiscal structure. This stands in strong contrast to the findings of Serletis and Afxentiou (1998) 
who, using annual data from 1926 to 1994, find no evidence of any regularity arising between 
their set of Hodrick-Prescott filtered policy target variables (output and unemployment) and a set 
of similarly filtered government policy instruments (government consumption and investment).  
More recently, Heckelman (2006) has used unemployment data to re-examine the evidence on 
rational partisan cycles in Canada and finds no support for rational political cycles. 
We reexamine these questions using Engel-Granger cointegration analysis over a long 
time period.  Our findings come closer to Serletis and Afxentiou (1998) and Heckelman (2006) 
than to Kneebone and McKenzie (2001) by adding to the growing evidence that suggests that 
partisan and opportunistic political theories cannot explain the fiscal policy variations needed to 
explain the observed “political” cycle in Canadian macro data.  Nevertheless, the paradox 
presented by the presence of a political business cycle and the absence of a political budget cycle 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
41 On the latter point see the recent work of Malley, Philippopoulos and Woitek (2005). 
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is quite striking and suggests either that partisan effects work through another arm or dimension 
of economic policy (such as the composition of spending or taxation) or that the results 
appearing in Tables 2 and 3 are more likely to reflect reverse causation – the election of more 
liberal (more conservative) governments when times are expected to be better (worse).   
Of greater independent interest, our paper presents evidence of a different set of channels 
by which political factors do interact with policy and evidence of that interaction occurs at all 
stages of the analysis through what we have called political competition.  Thus we find evidence 
that the degree of political competition produces not only transitory effects on long run size but 
also more permanent effects on the variance of short run fiscal policy instruments about long run 
equilibrium values.  Hence what is insightful in our findings is the implication that greater 
political competition not only reduces the amount of dissipation in the provision of any particular 
level of government service but also makes its short run impact more focused and symmetric – 
whether considered automatic or discretionary – in response to the cycle.    
What remains to be answered is whether partisan and opportunistic aspects of politics 
interaction in more complicated ways with other dimensions of economic policy or whether the 
correlations implied by the political cycle reflect reverse causation.  In either case, what does 
seem clear from our analysis is that in connecting politics to policy, the degree of political 
competition matters. 
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Data Appendix 
The data used in this study come from four basic sources: Canadian Historical Statistics, for the 
structural variables in the earliest time period (1870 through 1921); Cansim, the statistical database 
maintained by Statistics Canada, for these variables in the later time period (1921-2001); Gillespie’s 
(1991) reworking of the Federal public accounts from 1870 to 1990, updated by Ferris and Winer 
(2003); and for the political variables Beck (1968), Office of the Chief Electoral Officer of Canada (at 
http://www.parl.gc.ca/information/) and the Canadian Parliamentary Guide (1997, 2002).   
 
1.   List of Economic Variable Names and Data Sources: 
 
AGRIC = proportion of the labor force in agriculture. 1871-1926: Urquhart, (1993), 24-55; 1926-
1995 Cansim series D31251 divided by D31252; 1996-2001: Cansim II series V2710106 divided by 
V2710104. 
 
D = first difference operator 
 
EXPORTS and IMPORTS = exports and imports. 1870-1926, Urquhart, (1993) Table 1.4; 1927-
1960, Leacy, et al, 1983, Series G383, 384; 1961-2001: CANSIM series D14833 & D14836.    
OPEN = openness.  Calculated as: (EXPORTS + IMPORTS) / GNP. 
 
GNP = gross national product in current dollars. 1870-1926: Urquhart (1993), pp. 24-25 (in millions); 
1927-1938: Leacy et al (1983), Series E12, p.130; 1939–1960 Canadian Economic Observer, 
Historical Statistical Supplement 1986, Statistics Canada Catalogue 11-210 Table 1.4. CANSIM 
D11073 = GNP at market prices. 1961-2001 Cansim I D16466 = Cansim II V499724 (aggregated 
from quarterly data). 
 
GOV = total government expenditure net of interest payments.1870-1989: Gillespie (1991), 
pp.284-286; 1990-1996: Public Accounts of Canada 1996-97: 1997-2000: Federal Government Public 
Accounts, Table 3 Budgetary Revenues Department of Finance web site, September 2001. To this we 
add the return on government investment (ROI) originally subtracted by Gillespie for his own 
purposes.  Expenditure is net of interest paid to the private sector. Data on ROI: 1870 to 1915:  Public 
Accounts 1917 p.64; 1915-1967: Dominion Government Revenue and Expenditure: Details of 
Adjustments 1915-1967 Table W-1; 1916-17 to 1966-67: Securing Economic Renewal - The Fiscal 
Plan, Feb 10, 1988, Table XI; 1987-88 to 1996-97: Public Accounts 1996, Table 2.2. Interest on the 
Debt (ID) was subtracted out (with adjustment for interest paid to the Bank of Canada (BCI) 
ultimately returned to the government). Data on ID: 1870-1926: Historical Statistics of Canada, Series 
H19-34: Federal Government budgetary expenditures, classified by function, 1867-1975; 1926-1995: 
Cansim D11166. 1996-2000: Cansim D18445. Finally, data for BCI: copied by hand from the Annual 
Reports of The Bank of Canada, Statement of Income and Expense, Annually, 1935-2000. Net Income 
paid to the Receiver General (for the Consolidated Revenue Acct).  Note: all government data had to 
be converted from fiscal to calendar years. 
 
GSIZE = the relative size of non-interest central government public expenditure, calculated as  
GOV /GNP. 
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IMMIG = immigration numbers. 1868 – 1953: Firestone (1958), Table 83, Population, Families, 
Births, Deaths; Updated by Cansim D27 (1955 to 1996). Cansim Sum of X100615 (Females) plus 
X100614 (Men) for 1954;1997-2001, Cansim D27 (sum of quarters). 
 
IMRATIO = IMMIG/POP. 
 
LN = the log operator. 
 
LNDEFICIT = LNGSIZE - LNTAXSIZE 
 
MB = Money Base.  Metcalfe, Redish and Shearer, New Estimates of the Canadian Money Stock 
1871-1967; 1967-2002, Cansim B1646 (annual average of monthly data). 
 
MBRATIO = (MB- MB(-1))/GNP 
 
P = GNP deflator before 1927 and GDP deflator after (1986 = 100). 1870-1926: Urquhart, (1993), 
24-25;1927-1995 (1986=100): Cansim data label D14476; 1996-2001 Cansim D140668.  All indexes 
converted to 1986 = 100 basis. 
 
POP = Canadian population. 1870-1926:  Urquhart, (1993), 24-25; 1927 - 1995:  CANSIM data label 
D31248; 1995 - 2001: Cansim D1 (average of four quarters). 
 
ROI = Return on Investment that Irwin subtracted from revenues and receipts. 
Sources: 1867-68 to 1915-16:  Public Accounts 1917 p.64; 1915-1967: Dominion Government 
Revenue and Expenditure: Details of Adjustments 1915-1967 Table W-1; 1916-17 to 1966-67: 
Securing Economic Renewal - The Fiscal Plan, Feb 10, 1988, Table XI;1987-88 to 1996-97: Public 
Accounts 1996, Table 2.2 
 
RGNP = real GNP = GNP/P;  RYPC = real income per capita = GNP/(P*POP). 
 
TAXSUM = the sum of the fourteen different categories of taxes collected in Canada.  The fourteen 
categories include: 1. Custom Duties - Customs Import Duties (in Public Accounts); 2. ExciseDuties - 
Excise Duties (in Public Accounts), included in ExciseTaxes after 1990; 3. Sales Tax - Sales Tax (in 
Public Accounts).  GST replaces Sales Tax from 1991;  4. Excise Taxes - Other (in Public Accounts), 
includes Excise Duties after 1990; 5. Personal Income Tax - Income Tax, Personal (in Public 
Accounts); 6. Corporate Income Tax - Income Tax, Corporate (in Public Accounts); 7. Non Resident - 
Non-resident Income Tax (in Public Accounts), included in Other Income Tax Revenues after 1994; 8. 
Excess Profits - Energy Taxes (in Public Accounts); 9. Estates Taxes - 0 after 1977; 10. Post Office 
Revenues - 0 after 1983; 11. Misc. Revenues - Other Non Tax Revenues (in Public Accounts); 12. 
Special Recipient and Other Credits - Refunds of previous year’s expenditure, Services and service 
fees, Privileges, licences and permits, Proceeds from Sales, Bullion and coinage. Excludes  premium 
and discount on exchange. This category listed as Misc.Revenues after 1989; 13. UIC Taxes - 
Unemployment Insurance Contribution, Government Contribution (in Public Accounts); 14. Old Age 
Security - 0 after 1977; Sources: 1868-1989: W. Irwin Gillespie, Tax, Borrow and Spend: Financing 
Federal Spending in Canada, 1867 - 1990, Carleton University Press, 1991, pp.284-286;  1996-97, 
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Public Accounts of Canada; 1997-2000: Federal Government Public Accounts, Table 3 Budgetary 
Revenues Department of Finance web site, September 2001.  
 
TAXES =  TAXSUM  +  ROI;   
TAXSIZE = TAXES/GNP 
 
WWI = 1 for 1914 - 1919; = 0 otherwise. WW1after = 1 for 1919-1921; = 0 otherwise. 
WWII = 1 for 1940 - 1945; ½ for 1939 and 1946 = 0 otherwise. WW2after = 1 for 1946-1949; = 0 
otherwise. WWIIAftermath = 1 from 1946 onward; = 0 otherwise. 
 
YOUNG = percentage of the population below 17. 1870-1920 Leacey et al (1983). Interpolated from 
Census figures Table A28- 45 sum of columns 29, 30, 31, and 32 all divided by 28 (adjusted to make 
1921 the same); 1921-2001 Cansim C892547.  
 
 
2. List of Political Variable Names and Data Sources:   
The dating of each election was chosen to reflect the first year that each elected party was in power 
(when elections concentrate in the early summer and late fall time periods).  Thus if an election was 
held between January and July, the election was viewed as in the actual calendar year of the election.  
However, if the election was held between August and December, the election was attributed to the 
following year.  On this basis: 
   
DURATION = ELAPSE*[LIBERAL – (1-LIBERAL)].   
ELAPSE = the number of years since the last election. 
ELECTIONYEAR = 1 if an election year; = 0 otherwise.  
LIBERAL = 1 if governing party was the Liberal Party; = 0 if any other (more conservative) party. 
MINORITY = 1 if the governing party was part of a minority government; = 0 otherwise. 
PARTISAN = [LIBERAL – (1-LIBERAL)] 
SEATS = percentage of the seats won by the governing party. 
LIBERAL SURPRISE = (1-SEATS)*[LIBERAL – (1-LIBERAL)] 
 
Data Sources for political variables:   
Beck, Murray, J. (1968). Pendulum of Power. Scarborough: Prentice Hall of Canada. 
Canadian Parliamentary Guide. Various years (1997, 2002, 2006).  
Elections Canada (2001). Thirty Seventh General Election. Ottawa.  
Scarrow, Howard A.(1962). Canada Votes: A Handbook of Federal and Provincial Election Data.  
Hauser Printing Company. 
Web site of the Parliament of Canada: http://www. parl.gc.ca/information/
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Table 1a 
  Descriptive Statistics for Economic Outcomes and Political Variables, 1870 – 2000 
 
 GROWTH INFLATION USGROWTH USINFLATION ELECTION YEAR ELAPSE LIBERAL MINORITY
A SEATSA SURPRISEA DURATION SURPRISEB
Mean 3.69 2.39 4.06 1.95 0.27 1.687 0.595 0.11 0.60 0.089 0.237 0.091 
Median 4.23 2.23 5.24 1.73 0 2 1 0 0.59 0.294 0 0.302 
Maximum 16.5 16.7 22.9 17.98 1 5 1 1 0.79 0.587 4 0.587 
Minimum -12.5 -12.3 -24.8 -13.89 0 0 0 0 0.41 -0.577 -5 -0.577 
Std. Dev. 5.1 4.68 9.64 4.71 0.44 1.38 0.493 0.310 0.086 0.400 2.16 0.360 
ADF (var. 
lags)# -8.65* -6.22* -11.71* -5.28* -11.86* -10.48* -4.23* -5.66* -5.02* -4.77* -5.34* -4.80* 
Notes: * = significant at one percent. ADF critical value at 1% = - 3.48 (MacKinnon 1996). #  uses the Schwarz Criteria for choosing the appropriate number of lags. 
 A (B) = Definition A (B) for MINORITY, SEATS, SURPRISE and DURATION. See notes to Table 2.   
PARTISAN = [LIBERAL- (1-LIBERAL)];  SURPRISE = (1-SEATS)*[LIBERAL- (1-LIBERAL)];  
DURATION = ELAPSE*[LIBERAL-(1-LIBERAL)].   
    
Table 1b 
Descriptive Statistics of Macroeconomic Aggregates and Government Size Variables, 1871 - 2000 
                                        
 LNGSIZE LNTAXSIZE LNRYPC LNAGRIC LNIMRATIO LNYOUNG LNOPEN LNDEFICIT MBRATIO 
Mean -2.36 -2.29 8.67 -1.64 -4.90 3.59 -0.83 -0.07 0.004 
Median -2.26 -2.37 8.47 -1.09 -4.90 3.65 -0.87 -0.08 0.003 
Maximum -0.838 -1.36 10.1 -0.54 -2.95 3.88 -0.13 0.63 0.024 
Minimum -3.35 -3.08 7.39 -3.61 -7.28 3.14 -1.18 -0.66 -0.009 
Std. Dev. 0.625 0.527 0.81 1.02 0.89 0.19 0.22 0.26 0.005 
ADF# (var. lags): Levels -2.58 -1.38 0.17 2.37 -2.96 -0.105 -074 -5.22* -4.10* 
ADF#  (var. lags): Differences -7.13* -7.30* -8.96* -7.87* -9.65* -2.55*** -8.07*   
Notes: * (**)(***) =  significant at one (five)(ten) percent. ADF critical value at 5% = - 2.88 (MacKinnon 1996). 
GSIZE = central government spending after netting out interest payments to the private sector (but including grants to lower levels of government).  
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#  uses the Schwarz Criteria for choosing the appropriate number of lags 
Table 2 
The Effect of Political Variables on the Growth Rate in Canada: 1870 - 2000 
(Newey-West HAC t-statistics in brackets). 
 
Dependent Variable (1) 
GROWTH 
of RGNP 
1873 - 2000 
(2) 
GROWTH 
of RGNP 
1873 - 2000 
(3) 
GROWTH 
of RGNP 
1921-2000 
(4) 
GROWTH 
of RGNP 
1873-2000 
(5) 
GROWTH 
of RGNP 
1921-2000 
Constant 1.14** 
(2.69) 
1.09** 
(2.35) 
1.34* 
(2.84) 
1.08** 
(2.52) 
1.34* 
(2.87) 
ELECTION YEAR 0.961 
(1.36) 
0.925 
(1.23) 
0.705 
(0.917) 
0.927 
(1.33) 
0.706 
(1.01) 
PARTISAN 0.809** 
(2.40)     
SURPRISE  
(definition A)  
2.43** 
(1.99) 
2.24*** 
(1.85)  
 
 
SURPRISE  
(definition B)    
2.32*** 
(1.92) 
2.22** 
(2.15) 
DURATION  -0.109 (0.464) 
-0.085 
(0.350) 
-0.097 
(0.461) 
-0.083 
(0.446) 
USGROWTH 0.320* 
(6.74) 
0.320* 
(9.22) 
0.352* 
(10.03) 
0.321* 
(6.80) 
0.352* 
(7.40) 
USGROWTH(-1) 
  
0.147* 
(3.05) 
0.150* 
(4.35) 
0.122* 
(3.49) 
0.150* 
(3.19) 
0.122*** 
(1.84) 
USGROWTH(-2) 0.071** 
(2.05) 
0.074** 
(2.13) 
0.069** 
(1.97) 
0.074** 
(2.18) 
0.069*** 
(1.94) 
Statistics: 
No. of Observations 
Adj. R2
D.W.  
Akaike info criterion 
Wald Prob [c(2) = c(3) = 
c(4)  = 0] 
128 
0.471 
2.16 
5.52 
0.008* 
 
128 
0.468 
2.15 
5.53 
0.07*** 
 
80 
0.631 
2.28 
5.12 
0.16 
128 
0.467 
2.15 
5.53 
0.015**  
80 
0.631 
2.28 
5.12 
0.038** 
Notes: * (**)(***) significantly different from zero at 1% (5%) (10%).   
PARTISAN = [LIBERAL-(1-LIBERAL)]; SURPRISE = (1-SEATS)*[LIBERAL-(1-LIBERAL)];  
DURATION = ELAPSE*[LIBERAL-(1-LIBERAL)].   
Definition A -  Fraction of Seats won by the governing party and minority status as determined by Beck (1968): 1870-
1944;  Canadian Parliament Web Site (2006): 1945-2000. 
Definition B - Fraction of Seats won by the governing party and minority status as determined by the Canadian 
Parliamentary Guide (2002): 1870-2000.      
Note on the dating of elections:  Elections occurring between January 1 and July 30 are part of the current calendar year; 
otherwise they are considered to be in the following year.  
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Table 3 
The Effect of Political Variables on the Inflation Rate in Canada: 1870 - 2000 
(Newey-West HAC t-statistics in brackets) 
 
Dependent Variable   (1) 
Inflation 
Rate 
1872-2000 
(2) 
Inflation 
Rate 
1872-2000 
(3) 
Inflation 
Rate 
1921-2000
(4) 
Inflation 
Rate 
1872-2000 
(5) 
Inflation 
Rate 
1921-2000 
Constant 0.388 
(1.64) 
0.330 
(1.31) 
0.292 
(0.727) 
0.330 
(1.18) 
0.292 
(0.879) 
ELECTION YEAR(+1) 0.825*** 
(1.94) 
0.927*** 
(1.92) 
0.314 
(0.560) 
0.923*** 
(1.86) 
0.308 
(0.575) 
PARTISAN 
 
0.258 
(1.23)     
SURPRISE  
(definition A)  
1.42*** 
(1.72) 
1.29 
(1.17)   
SURPRISE  
(definition B)    
1.36*** 
(1.70) 
1.24 
(1.45) 
DURATION  -0.182 (0.929) 
-0.094 
(0.448) 
-0.175 
(1.16) 
-0.090 
(0.535) 
USINFLATION 0.807* 
(14.31) 
0.801* 
(13.13) 
0.812* 
(10.08) 
0.802* 
(13.24) 
0.813* 
(12.82) 
USINFLATION(-1)   
 
0.061 
(1.18) 
0.066 
(1.32) 
0.076 
(1.21) 
0.066 
(1.09) 
0.076 
(1.27) 
Statistics: 
No. of Obs 
Adj. R2
D.W.  
Akaike Info criterion 
WALD Prob[c(2)=c(3) = 
c(4) = c(5)= 0] 
 
129 
0.729 
1.76 
4.67 
0.049** 
 
129 
0.730 
1.77 
4.67 
0.11 
 
80 
0.780 
1.03 
4.34 
0.50 
 
129 
0.730 
1.77 
4.67 
0.14 
 
80 
0.779 
1.03 
4.34 
0.47 
Notes: * (**)(***) significantly different from zero at 1% (5%) (10%). 
For definitions, see Table 2. 
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Table 4 
Engle-Granger Cointegrating Equations for LNGSIZE and TAXSIZE: 1870-2000 
(Absolute value of t-statistics in brackets) 
 GSIZE 
 
(1) 
GSIZE 
(Political) 
(2) 
GSIZE 
(Saikkonen)#
(3) 
TAXSIZE 
 
(4) 
TAXSIZE 
(Political) 
(5) 
TAXSIZE 
(Saikkonen)#
(6) 
Constant -4.29 
(2.97) 
-5.54 
(3.75) 
-10.34* 
(6.72) 
-2.52 
(2.71) 
-2.66 
(2.76) 
-3.61* 
(2.84) 
LNRYPC 0.113 
(1.12) 
0.164 
(1.65) 
0.506* 
(5.31) 
0.060 
(0.814) 
0.063 
(0.854) 
0.065 
(0.748) 
LNAGRIC -0.057 
(0.791) 
-0.077 
(1.08) 
0.186** 
(2.11) 
0.101 
(2.34) 
0.097 
(2.14) 
0.022 
(0.364) 
LNIMRATIO -0.090 
(4.17) 
-0.090 
(4.29) 
-0.090* 
(4.18) 
0.006 
(0.480) 
0.007 
(0.543) 
-0.011 
(0.620) 
LNYOUNG -0.090 
(0.357) 
0.053 
(0.212) 
0.495*** 
(1.83) 
-0.162 
(1.21) 
-0.132 
(0.513) 
0.050 
(0.277) 
LNOPEN -0.503 
(3.78) 
-0.477 
(3.67) 
-0.310** 
(2.24) 
0.033 
(0.493) 
0.035 
(0.916) 
-0.039 
(0.443) 
FIXED_EXCH -0.201 
(4.45) 
-0.179 
(4.01) 
-0.130* 
(3.36) 
-0.088 
(3.71) 
-0.087 
(3.64) 
-0.042 
(1.68) 
WW1 0.723 
(8.30) 
0.704 
(8.26) 
0.541* 
(6.48) 
0.058 
(1.01) 
0.059 
(1.02) 
0.159** 
(2.30) 
WW1Aftermath    0.327 (7.90) 
0.333 
(7.76) 
0.399* 
(7.18) 
WW2 1.69 
(14.87) 
1.61 
(14.14) 
1.37* 
(12.72) 
0.951 
(16.48) 
0.948   
(16.36) 
0.830* 
(12.31) 
WW2Aftermath 0.767 
(9.35) 
0.705 
(8.49) 
0.777* 
(7.87) 
0.755 
(18.71) 
0.749 
(18.03) 
0.644* 
(9.47) 
SEATS_a  0.508 (2.76) 
1.78* 
(6.70)    
MINORITY_a     -0.016 (0.575) 
-0.115** 
(2.33) 
Statistics: 
Observations 
Adj R2
D.W. 
ADF test statistics 
MacKinnon (1996) 
critical values 
       1% for 6 var = -5.12  
       5% for 7 var = -5.44 
131 
0.927 
0.778 
 
 
 
-5.75* 
 
131 
0.931 
0.826 
 
 
 
 
-5.98* 
 
131 
.975 
0.948 
 
 
 
-6.63* 
 
131 
0.975 
0.948 
 
 
 
 
-6.64* 
 
* (**)[***] significant at 1% (5%) [10%]. 
# Saikkonen’s (1991) estimator adjusts for inconsistency in the standard errors of the I(1) variables in the cointegrating equation by 
including the contemporaneous, lagged and led values of the first differences of both left and right hand side variables (with the exception of 
the dummy variables).  Only the coefficients of the level terms are relevant and so presented.  In addition, the standard errors and t-statistics 
were adjusted for the presence of correlation among the innovations of the I(1) variables by a factor formed by the ratio of two standard 
errors a) the standard error of the augmented equation divided by b) the “long run standard error”.  The latter is calculated as the square root 
of the variance plus two times the weighted sum of the significant autocovariances among the residuals (Saikkonen, 1991).  This adjustment 
led to the originally estimated t-statistics in column (3) being multiplied by the factor .933 and the t-stats in (6) by the factor .874. 
Table 5 
    Error Correction Models of Fiscal Policy 
 Changes in Federal Government Expenditures/Taxes and Deficit as a Fraction of GDP: 1871 - 2000 
( Absolute value of t-statistics in brackets) 
      (1) 
     Base Case 
1871 - 2000 
          (2) 
Equations 
1871 - 2000  
      (3)         
         Political 
1871 - 2000 
            (4)  
Variables 
1871 - 2000 
      (5) 
Deficit 
1871-2000 
      (6) 
Deficit 
1871 - 2000 
Dependent 
Variable D(LNGSIZE) D(LNTAXSIZE) D(LNGSIZE) D(LNTAXSIZE) LNDEFICIT LNDEFICIT 
Error Correction 
term 
-0.243* 
(3.88) 
-0.234* 
(3.75) 
-0.252* 
(3.68) 
-0.238* 
(3.81)   
 D(LNRYPC) -0.741* 
(3.43) 
-0.188*** 
(1.75) 
-0.730* 
(3.39) 
-0.185*** 
(1.73) 
-0.869* 
(2.94) 
-1.43* 
(4.34) 
D(LNAGRIC) -0.567*** 
(1.84) 
-0.177 
(1.15) 
-0.529*** 
(1.72) 
-0.176 
(1.14) 
-0.372 
(0.730) 
-0.397 
(0.849) 
D(LNYOUNG) -2.94** 
(2.41) 
-1.37** 
(2.29) 
-3.04* 
(2.48) 
-1.35** 
(2.28) 
-7.82* 
(4.77) 
-5.54* 
(2.95) 
D(LNIMRATIO) -0.083* 
(3.16) 
0.017 
(1.25) 
-0.085* 
(3.32) 
0.017 
(1.29) 
0.066*** 
(1.80) 
-0.014 
(0.353) 
D(LNOPEN) -0.108 
(0.601) 
0.152*** 
(1.69) 
-0.085 
(0.478) 
0.153*** 
(1.71) 
0.435*** 
(1.74) 
0.334 
(1.21) 
Constant -0.323* 
(3.96) 
-0.133* 
(3.43) 
-0.293* 
(3.68) 
-0.132* 
(3.40) 
-0.544* 
(4.14) 
-0.553* 
(4.56) 
WWI 0.195* 
(3.99) 
0.019 
(0.944) 
0.194* 
(3.97) 
0.019 
(0.782) 
0.626* 
(8.08) 
0.530* 
(5.78) 
WWIAfter -0.312* 
(4.48) 
0.111* 
(3.22) 
-0.308* 
(4.42) 
0.111* 
(3.22) 
-0.213* 
(4.34) 
-0.150 
(1.37) 
WWII 0.178* 
(3.62) 
0.144* 
(5.93) 
0.175* 
(3.56) 
0.144* 
(5.93) 
0.777* 
(9.46) 
0.347* 
(3.35) 
WWIIAfter -0.308* 
(5.23) 
-0.098* 
(3.27) 
-0.282 
(4.69) 
-0.097* 
(3.28) 
-0.236* 
(5.57) 
-0.219** 
(2.45) 
FIXED 
EXCHANGE 
RATES 
0.052** 
(2.58) 
0.009 
(0.944) 
0.052* 
(2.57) 
0.010 
(0.951) 
-0.056 
(1.38) 
-0.046 
(1.48) 
SEATS_a 0.479* 
(3.77) 
0.203* 
(3.37) 
0.428* 
(3.47) 
0.200** 
(3.33) 
0.754* 
(4.25) 
0.682* 
(3.58) 
MBRATIO      14.47* (3.13) 
Statistics: 
No. of 
Observations 
Adj. R2
D.W. 
Akaike info 
criterion 
 
130 
0.532 
1.66 
-1.59 
 
130 
0.470 
1.69 
-2.99 
 
130 
0.533 
1.65 
-1.59 
 
130 
0.472 
1.68 
-3.00 
 
130 
0.685 
0.830 
-0.897 
 
129 
0.643 
0.820 
-0.756 
 
Notes: * (**) [***] significant at 1% (5%)  (10%).  
The error correction term used for each equation was the lagged residual from the corresponding column in Table 2.   
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Appendix: 
 
Extreme Bound Analysis Concerning the Role of Opportunistic 
and Partisan Political Factors in Public Expenditure 
(using Table 5, column 1) 
 
 
   
 SeatsA   Minority Election year Lagged  Elapse Liberal 
Eq0 0.479*     
Eq1 0.533* 0.022    
Eq2 0.481*  -0.005   
Eq3 0.473*   0.002  
Eq4 0.492*    0.024 
Eq5 0.535* 0.023 -0.006   
Eq6 0.531* 0.025  0.003  
Eq7 0.549* 0.024   0.024 
Eq8 0.475*  -0.003 0.002  
Eq9 0.486*   0.003 0.024 
Eq10 0.495*  -0.008  0.025 
Eq11 0.532* 0.025 -0.004 0.003  
Eq12 0.489*  -0.006 0.002 0.025 
Eq13 0.548* 0.027  0.003 0.024 
Eq14 0.553* 0.024 -0.009  0.026 
Eq15 0.550* 0.027 -0.006 0.003 0.025 
      
      
Average 0.513 0.025 -0.006 0.003 0.025 
Std. Dev 0.031 0.0018 0.002 0.0005 0.0007 
*significantly different from zero at one per cent.                         
  
Extreme Bounds Analysis Table 
      
Variable 
Name 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
% Sign. at 1% % Sign at 10% Standard Deviation 
      
SeatsA 0.473 0.553 100% 100% 0.031 
Minority 0.022 0.027 0 0 0.025 
Election 
year -0.009 -0.003 0 0 0.002 
Elapse 0.002 0.003 0 0 0.003 
Liberal 0.024 0.026 0 0 0.0007 
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